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1. INTRODUCTION
Current International law governing marine mammals,
including cetaceans (whales), consists of customary principles and
provisions of relevant international agreements, including the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)
and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS).' Article III of the ICRW allowed for the establish-
ment of an International Whaling Commission (IWC or Commis-
sion) to regulate global whale stocks and the commercial whaling
industry. This article discusses the history of the three structural
weaknesses of the ICRW (as well as the regulatory power of the
Jared W. Zemantauski, Esq. (J.D. 2006, University of Miami School of Law;
M.A. 2003 Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science - University of
Miami; B.A. 2003, University of Miami) is an adjunct faculty member of the
Rosenstiel School of Marine and Atmospheric Science at the University of Miami,
where he teaches Ocean Law and lectures on the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea. Mr. Zemantauski acquired extensive experience with environmental
issues and government regulations while working as an environmental consultant
and attorney. He is currently an attorney with Beighley, Myrick & Udell, P.A. in
Miami, Florida.
1. William T. Burke, A New Whaling Agreement and International Law, in
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 52 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001).
2. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat.
1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 74 [hereinafter ICRW1.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43:2
IWC): the objections clause; the scientific permits provision; and
its failure to create an enforcement mechanism. It also outlines
the effects of UNCLOS on the IWC's authority to regulate whaling
throughout the world. Indeed, by interpreting articles 65 and 120
of UNCLOS, which obligate member states to cooperate with
appropriate international organizations for the conservation of
marine mammals within national EEZ's3 and the high seas 4
respectively, this article will show that member states are obli-
gated to follow the decisions and regulations of the IWC governing
whaling activates. It will further explore the concept of utilizing
the dispute settlement provisions of UNCLOS to enforce IWC
regulations.
2. WEAKNESSES OF THE IWC
Three provisions of the IWC's charter disable the Commis-
sion's ability to regulate whaling: the objections clause (article V,
para. 3), the scientific permit provision (article VIII, para. 1), and
the enforcement provision (article IX).' Although the Commission
has been able to bring the world's attention to the plight of the
whale, creating some protections through the utilization of a com-
mercial whaling moratorium, the above referenced provisions of
the ICRW have left the Commission unable to enforce its own reg-
ulations for three major reasons.' First, a member state that dis-
agrees with an IWC regulation may file an objection, opting-out of
the regulation and exempting itself from the rule. Second, the
scientific permit provision allows a member state to conduct scien-
tific research during the commercial moratorium including lethal
research on endangered whale stocks.9 And third, the Commis-
sion has no inherent authority to enforce punishment of infrac-
tions, as its power is vested in the member state having
jurisdiction over the violator."o Accordingly, the Commission has
no capability to ensure member state compliance with its regula-
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec.
10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOS Convention].
4. Id. Art. 120.
5. Id. Part XV.
6. Elizabeth A. Wehrmeister, Giving the Cat Claws: Proposed Amendments to the
International Whaling Convention, 11 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 417, 418 (1989).
7. Adrienne M. Ruffle, Resurrecting the International Whaling Commission:
Suggestions to Strengthen the Conservation Effort, 27 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 639, 652
(2001).
8. ICRW, supra note 2, Art. V, para. 3.
9. Id. at Art. VIII, para. 1.
10. Id. at Art. IX, para. 3.
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tions, including the commercial whaling moratorium, on an inter-
national level."
2.1 The Objections Clause
The objections clause is found in article V, paragraph 3 of the
Convention and the process can be summarized as follows:
Amendments . . . do not become effective:
(i) until 90 days after their notification by the Com-
mission to the Contracting Governments;
(ii) if any Government delivers an objection before the
end of this period, such objection delays the entry
into force for all governments for a further 90
days;
(iii) during this second 90 day period any government
can still object;
(iv) if any objection is received during this second 90
day period any Government can object within a
period of 30 days from the date upon which the
last objection of the second 90 day period was
received, whichever of (iii) or (iv) is the later;
(v) at the end of this period (which could be as long as
210 days, i.e. seven months) the amendment
comes into force only for the governments that
have not objected. 12
This provision "has often been criticized for 'taking the teeth' out
of the Commission" by allowing a country "to delay the implemen-
tation of a regulation in all other member states" while completely
exempting itself from the regulation by simply "lodging a timely
objection."" "This procedure has been used to avoid otherwise
applicable quotas, reject classification of stocks where it would
reduce whaling activities, and even to ignore IWC decisions on
standards of humane killing."1 4
In 1954, one of the Commission's first conservation measures,
for the prohibition on the taking of blue whales in the North
Pacific, was defeated when Canada, Japan, the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. lodged formal objections." Against the Commission's
11. Ruffle, supra note 7 at 653.
12. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 421.
13. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 653.
14. Dean M. Wilkinson, The Use of Domestic Measures to Enforce International
Whaling Agreements: A Critical Perspective, 17 DENv. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 271, 276
(1988).
15. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 654.
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decision to ban the use of the cold harpoon as an inhumane
method of whaling in 1981, Brazil, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and
the Soviet Union lodged objections.1 6 Following this, four of the
seven whaling states that voted against the commercial whaling
moratorium (Japan, U.S.S.R., Norway, and Peru) filed timely
objections, legally exempting themselves from the ban on commer-
cial whaling." Even a decision such as the IWC vote of 25-1 for a
zero quota on male sperm whales in the North Pacific was ineffec-
tive when "the dissenting country, Japan, lodged an objection and
continued whaling.""
Objections to such scenarios have been lodged at IWC meet-
ings for many years, highlighting that they render provisions of
the Convention ineffective.19 The objections clause was arguably
included in the Convention to reflect the traditional international
legal theory that a sovereign state is only bound by that which it
has expressly agreed.2 0 Since its passage, countries have been
able invoke their power to object and thus not be in violation of the
IWC's regulations "regardless of their whaling practices." 2 ' This
compromise is common to many international agreements, but
has left the IWC powerless to address the concerns of the conser-
vation minded majority.2 2
2.2 Scientific Permits Provision
"Pursuant to Article VIII, paragraph 1 of the Convention, any
country that wishes to conduct scientific research on whales may
invoke the scientific research provision" and be exempted from
IWC regulations.23 The provision provides:
"Notwithstanding anything contained in this convention,
and Contracting Government may grant to any of its
nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill,
take, and treat whales for purposes of scientific research
subject to such restrictions as the Contracting Government
thinks fit, and the killing taking and treating of whales in
accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be
16. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 276.
17. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 422.
18. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 276.
19. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 654.
20. Id.
21. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 422.
22. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 654.
23. Id. at 655.
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exempt from the operation of this Convention."24
The use of scientific permits serves both a vital purpose in aiding
the Commission to determine the size and viability of whale
stocks in addition to creating a tool for countries to thwart the
goals of the IWC (such as the commercial whaling moratorium).2 5
Prior to 1986, countries wishing to subvert IWC quotas mod-
estly utilized the procedures in Article VIII. However, "[w]ith the
imposition of the moratorium on commercial whaling, countries
like Japan have systematically invoked the exception to effectively
continue commercial whaling."26 For example, in 1976, Japan
issued a whalers permit to kill 240 Bryde's whales to circumvent a
zero quota on the stock. Within a week of the much-publicized
end to commercial whaling in the Antarctic in April of 1987,
Japan submitted a research proposal for taking 825 minke whales
and 50 sperm whales (to research stomach contents) annually
over a ten-year period.27 This announcement "generated a great
deal of controversy because the scientific community has known
for over a century that the sperm whales' primary prey is squid."
In addition an exorbitant amount of data already existed in both
Japan and the Soviet Union already answering the very question
the killing of the whales was designed to reach. When ques-
tioned about why the past data was not analyzed, a Japanese sci-
entist participating in a meeting of the Scientific Committee (of
the IWC) said that they were very curious about what the squid
ate (there are easier ways of catching squid than by opening the
stomachs of sperm whales); however, under further questioning,
the scientist admitted to not having a specialist in squid biology
on their team.2 9 Pro-whaling nations also conducted "feasibility
studies" to determine population levels via lethal samples of large
numbers of individuals of endangered whale stocks, which they
stated provides a more complete understanding of sustainable
catch limits." By allowing the killing of members of a species in
order to determine its population, the pro-whaling states truly are
"prostituting science to protect their commercial whaling
24. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 424 (citing International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 74).
25. Id. at 423.
26. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 655.
27. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 277.
28. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 656 - 57.
29. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 278.
30. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 657.
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interests.""
Certainly in the case of Japan, the scientific research excep-
tion has become an exception that has overtaken the rule, under-
mining "IWC regulations and conservation decisions during the
moratorium."32 Notably, the scientific research provision permits
"researching" countries to use whale meat collected after experi-
mentation in any manner they deem acceptable as long as the
meat is not exported outside of the country.3 3 Indeed, this scheme
has allowed "research" proposals to become thinly-veiled attempts
to skirt the moratorium, and that "as early as 1984, a Japanese
official was quoted as saying that research whaling in the
Antarctic was a possible way of continuing commercial operations
during the moratorium." 4 The Japanese research program "con-
cerning marine mammals is carried out under the auspices of the
government-linked Institute for Cetacean Research (Institute)"
and is "expected to function as a center of research efforts made by
independent researchers: such as national laboratories, universi-
ties, voluntary research institutions, and individual research-
ers. "" Yet, "the Institute is in charge of marketing whale meat
and other research byproducts once the whales are processed and
the data collected," with "sales averaging between $27 and $36
million per year, with the proceeds supposedly used to fund addi-
tional research."3 ' Although conservationists claim that Japan's
"scientific whaling" program is solely a mechanism to bypass the
moratorium, the state has a legal right under the ICRW to take
whales for study (no matter how the IWC views the permit propos-
als) and to process and utilize the catch.3 7
Japan is not the only country to utilize scientific research as a
means to continue commercial whaling. Iceland and South Korea
issued scientific permits to their commercial fleets after the mora-
torium, including a 200 whale per year permit to the Icelandic
Hvalur Whaling Company.3 8 Using criteria enunciated in its 1986
resolution, the IWC came to the conclusion that both Iceland and
South Korea were in violation of the Scientific Permit clause.
31. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 425.
32. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 655-6.
33. Id. at 656.
34. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 278.
35. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 651.
36. Id. at 652.
37. Robert L. Friedheim, The IWC as a Contested Regime, in TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME, 11 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001).
38. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 425.
39. Id.
330
LAW OF THE SEA
The 1986 resolution recommends certain supplemental criteria (in
addition to the "scientific purpose" criteria of article VIII, para. 1),
and both the contracting government prior to issuing a permit and
the Scientific Committee in reviewing the research results of prior
permits should consider whether:
(1) the objectives of the research are not practically and
scientifically feasible through non-lethal research
techniques;
(2) the proposed research is intended and structured
accordingly to contribute information essential for
rational management of the stock;
(3) the number, age and sex of whales to be taken are nec-
essary to complete the research and will facilitate the
conduct of the comprehensive assessment;
(4) whales will be killed in a manner consistent with the
provisions of Section III of the Schedule, due regard
being had to whether there are compelling scientific
reasons to the contrary.4 0
The IWC found the scientific permits of both Iceland and South
Korea to be in violation of the Convention and recommended that
the two member states revoke their respective permits. South
Korea responded to the IWC recommendation by canceling all sci-
entific whaling the same year while Iceland phased out their sci-
entific whaling over a four year period. This left Japan as the only
country circumventing the moratorium through the use of large-
scale scientific research."
2.3 Enforcement Provision
As a result of the IWC findings that the Icelandic and South
Korean scientific permits were not truly for scientific purposes,
neither country could rely on article VIII to exempt their whaling
operations from the moratorium.4 2 However, despite the Commis-
sion finding Iceland and South Korea in violation of the Conven-
tion, it lacked the authority to punish the countries and/or to end
their illegal "research" practices.4 3 The single greatest weakness
of the IWC is the Commission's lack of enforcement power.4 4 Due
to the United States insistence a provision for enforcement was
40. Id. at 424.
41. International Whaling Commission website, Special Permit Catches since
1985, http://www.iwcoffice.org/_documents/table-permit.htm.
42. Wehrmeister, supra note 6, at 426-427.
43. Id. at 427.
44. Id.
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removed from the Convention's final draft resulting in the article
IX seen today.4 5 Under such scheme, the Commission can only
rely on the individual member states to prosecute infractions of
the convention committed by its nationals and vessels in its
jurisdiction.4 6
This lack of enforcement has haunted the Commission from
its inception. Even with the objections clause and the scientific
permit provisions; the Commission has no authority to punish
states whose actions, which violate other parts of the Convention,
have dire effects on the Commission's goals. Article IX, paragraph
4 states:
Each Contracting Government shall transmit to the Com-
mission full details of each infraction of the provisions of
this Convention by persons or vessels under the jurisdiction
of that Government as reported by its inspectors. This
information shall include a statement of measures taken
for dealing with the infraction and of penalties imposed.47
Due to the Commission's inability to directly impose sanctions
against violating countries, many violations go unnoticed within
the pro-whaling nations or underreported and essentially unpun-
ished on an international level.48
Each member state is also required to report to the Commis-
sion scientific data relating to the number of whales of each spe-
cies captured, the number thereof lost at sea, each whale's sex and
length, and whether any females contained a fetus.49 These
reports are designed to assist the Commission in deciding the
various quotas of the associated whaling stocks. Unfortunately,
the Commission also lacks any authority to punish pro-whaling
nations for violating the reporting regulations."o The pro-whaling
states are then prone to act in their own self-interests and under-
report their statistics to the Commission, causing the calculations
of the global whale populations to be horribly inaccurate." The
most stunning example of under-reporting was committed by the
U.S.S.R. A former scientist in the Soviet Fisheries Ministry
uncovered secret documents indicating that the Soviets had
ordered the systematic slaughter of humpback whales over a
45. Wilkinson, supra note 14, at 276.
46. ICRW, supra note 2, Art. IX, para. . 1.
47. Id. at Art. IX, para. . 4.
48. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 658.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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twenty-year period.5 2 The country officially reported to the IWC
that only 2,710 humpbacks had been taken from 1948 to 1973, but
the documents proved that the Soviet Union killed 48,477 hump-
back whales during that time period.53 Data collected by the IWC
during that time alerted the Commission to the possibility of
deceptive reporting; but, lacking an effective enforcement mecha-
nism, the Commission was forced to incorporate the Soviet
Union's data into its own figures. Utilizing the false data
destroyed any concept of reliability in the IWC's calculations.54
In addition to the reporting requirements, each member state
is required to take "appropriate measures" to ensure the applica-
tion of the provisions of the Convention. 5 Due in part to the defi-
ciencies of self-monitoring and to the IWC's failure to compel
performance of treaty obligations, pro-whaling nations found two
additional routes around IWC regulations in the 1970s. These
nations would either re-flag their whaling ships in nonmember
countries, utilizing flags of convenience, or use their whaling ships
in "joint ventures" with nations that are not members of the
IWC." With non-IWC member nations being exempt from the
Commission's regulations, these ships could legally ignore all con-
servation guidelines. For example, in 1977 Japan actively sup-
ported the whaling industries of most non-member whaling
nations, including Chile, Cyprus, North and South Korea, Peru,
and Spain. 7 Thus these "pirate" whaling ships are often financed
or completely owned by nationals of a member state of the IWC,
all the while the member states ignore their responsibility to take
"appropriate measures."" Luckily this practice all but subsided by
the 1980's, but it left an avenue for countries such as Japan to
further their commercial whaling agendas.
As a result of the deficiencies in the ICRW the only leverage
available to the Commission is the power to "make recommenda-
tions to any or all contracting Governments on any matter that
relates to whales or whaling and to the objectives and purposes of
52. Id.
53. Id. at 659.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Gare Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past
and Reflections on the Future, 16 Nat. Resources Law. 543, 560 (1983).
57. Id.
58. Joseph P. Rosati, Enforcement Questions of the International Whaling
Commission: Are Exclusive Economic Zones the Solution?, 14 Cal. W. Int'l L.J. 114,
130 (1984).
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this Convention.""9 This wording grants the Commission the right
to comment on almost any matter. The United States lead adjust-
ment to article IX has thus removed the IWC from its intended
position as an international governing body with the ability to
make and enforce its will, and in put in its place a wizened advisor
who speaks but is rarely heard.
3. STRENGTHENING THE IWC: THE IMPACTS OF UNCLOS
Indisputably, the IWC has done much to bring the plight of
the whale to the world's attention. The Commission has exerted
its best efforts in attempting to conserve and protect these
leviathans, but at the same time it has also shown the world its
weaknesses. The Commission has shown that no regulation, no
matter how well written or scientifically supported, can succeed
without effective enforcement against violators. Although unt-
ested, that enforcement power is available to the IWC, and the
global community. The articles of UNCLOS provide the power to
compel nations to work with the IWC using a dispute settlement
procedure allowing nations to enforce IWC violations against one
another.
3.1 Cooperation with the IWC
In conducting this analysis on the UNCLOS articles, it must
be stated that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT) is the tool used in treaty interpretation:
1. A Treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of
the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a
treaty shall comprise in addition to the text, including
its preamble and annexes:
a. Any agreement relating to the treaty which was made
between all the parties in connection with the conclu-
sion of the treaty.
b. Any instrument which was made by one or more par-
ties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty
and accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty.
3. There shall also be taken into account, together with
this context:
59. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 659.
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a. Any subsequent agreement between the parties
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the
application of its provision;
b. Any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties
regarding its interpretation."
The articles of UNCLOS should be reviewed in good faith and in
accordance with the ordinary meaning of the incorporated terms.
In order to fully understand the enforcement power available to
the IWC, it is necessary to start this examination with the article
of UNCLOS that was incorporated to protect the whales. Article
65 of UNCLOS states:
Nothing in this Part restricts the right of a coastal state or
the competence of an international organization, as appro-
priate, to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of
marine mammals more strictly than provided for in this
Part. States shall cooperate with a view to the conserva-
tion of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall
in particular work through the appropriate international
organizations for their conservation, management, and
study.e"
In order to lay out the foundation of the IWC's new strength,
first the meaning of "appropriate international organizations"
must be determined. While the term "international organiza-
tions" does indicate that the drafters of UNCLOS imagined the
possibility of having more than one organization overseeing whale
conservation, the IWC is currently the only whaling regime exer-
cising any type of management authority over global whale stocks.
During the drafting of UNCLOS it was generally assumed that
Article 65 would consolidate the role of the IWC.62 In addition,
after the drafting of UNCLOS was completed, it was argued that
Article 65 "deferred" to the IWC in all matters related to the man-
agement of whales as the IWC was the only international organi-
zation under the regime established in the article." This view
resulted in the contention that "all parties to UNCLOS, even
those who were not also members of the IWC, would be bound by
60. Alexander Gillespie, Small Cetaceans, International Law and the
International Whaling Commission, 2 Melb. J. Int'l L. 257, 268 (2001).
61. LOS Convention, supra note 3, Art. 65.
62. Steven Freeland & Julie Drysdale, Co-operation or Chaos? - Article 65 of
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Future of the International
Whaling Commission, 2 MACQUARIE J. INT'L & COMP. ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2005).
63. Id. at 18-19.
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the IWC regulations."64 Even Iceland, a pro-whaling nation, had
formed the opinion that, in the absence of an alternate "appropri-
ate international organization," it was obligated to comply with
IWC regulations pursuant to Article 65 (regardless of a nation's
status as a member of the IWC).65
The possible alternative to the IWC, the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission (NAMMCO), was established in
1992 and has yet to garner large multi-national support and in
addition to only addressing marine mammal stocks in regional
settings (the North Atlantic Ocean).6 ' The IWC has been manag-
ing whales since 1946 (without any alternative regime usurping
its authority), and was in effect during the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1982, supporting the conten-
tion that the IWC is the central and uppermost international
authority for cetaceans.6 ' Additionally, the ICRW was recognized
in 1992 by Agenda 21 as an "appropriate international organiza-
tion" for cetaceans pursuant to the requirements contained in
Article 64 of UNCLOS." Being the uppermost international
authority for cetaceans, and being formally recognized as an
appropriate international organization for cetaceans by a United
Nations program, certifies the IWC as the "appropriate" interna-
tional organization as required in article 65.
An important note about article 65 is that although a member
of UNLCOS must work through the IWC (as the appropriate
international organization) in conserving, managing, and study-
ing cetaceans, they are in no way required to become a member of
the IWC. This is due to the fact that "working through" is also
achieved by: collaboration in constructing acceptable conservation
measures; timely submission of scientific information and data;
recognition and acceptance of scientific findings; voluntary conser-
vation measures; and coordination with enforcement schemes (to
name a few action).6" Other international organizations and trea-
ties have non-members working with them in such a way, includ-
ing the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working with the
IWC and the United States with respect to the UNCLOS. It is not
64. Id. at 19.
65. Id. at 21.
66. Steinar Andresen, "Good" Institutions but "Bad" Politics?, in TOWARD A
SUSTAINABLE WHALING REGIME 246 (Robert L. Friedheim ed., 2001).
67. Gillespie, supra note 60, at 284.
68. Rachelle Adam, The Japanese Dolphin Hunts: In Quest of International Legal
Protection for Small Cetaceans, 14 ANIMAL L. 133, 171 (2007-2008).
69. Burke, supra note 1, at 55.
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membership in the IWC that is critical to advancing cetacean
management, but instead cooperation with its regulations.
3.2 Jurisdiction of the IWC
With UNCLOS compelling member states (and most importantly
the pro-whaling states) to work through the IWC, the question
remains: over what waters does the IWC have jurisdiction to regu-
late whaling? The two sections of article I of the ICRW state:
1. This Convention includes the Schedule attached thereto
which forms an integral part thereof. All references to
"Convention" shall be understood as including the said
Schedule either in its present terms or as amended in
accordance with the provisions of Article V.
2. This Convention applies to factory ships, land stations,
and whale catchers under the jurisdiction of the Con-
tracting Governments and to all waters in which whal-
ing is prosecuted by such factory ships, land stations,
and whale catchers."
Paragraph two states that the IWC is granted jurisdiction in all
waters of the globe in which whaling is prosecuted, including reg-
ulating whaling within a state's territorial sea and over any appli-
cable land stations on its coast. The notion of the Commission's
authority to regulate whaling within a state's Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ), territorial sea, and sovereign soil (land stations) will
be rejected by the pro-whaling states (and possibly other nations).
While it is a natural reaction for the whaling states (whose objec-
tives are the opposite of the Commission's view of cetacean protec-
tion) to reject the Commission's carte blanche authority over "all
waters in which whaling is prosecuted" in light of the sovereign
rights associated with these waters under UNCLOS, a careful
reading of the UNCLOS articles actually provides the IWC with
the legal authority to intrude upon the sovereigns rights of states
within these same waters.
UNCLOS defines the boundaries of the EEZ in articles 55 and
57 as the area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea 7 to a
maximum distance of 200 nautical miles from the baseline used to
measure the breadth of the territorial sea (the outermost limit of
the territorial sea is 12 nautical miles from the baseline). 72 Pro-
whaling states argue that their sovereign rights to exploit the liv-
70. ICRW, supra note 2, Art. I.
71. LOS Convention, supra note 3, Art. 55.
72. LOS Convention, supra note 3, Art. 57.
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ing resources (whales) in their EEZ's are preempted by article 65.
The first sentence of article 65 asserting that "[niothing in this
Part restricts the right of a coastal state or the competence of an
international organization, as appropriate, to prohibit, limit or
regulate the exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than
provided for in this Part," allows the appropriate international
organization (the IWC as described above) to supersede a state's
sovereign rights in the EEZ with respect to regulating marine
mammals, especially cetaceans.73 This revised text, approved with
minor revisions, "makes clear that it permits either a complete
prohibition or more restrictive limitations or regulations to protect
marine mammals than the Convention [UNCLOS] would other-
wise require."7 4 Not only does article 65 recognize the IWC's
power to set regulations (including the current moratorium)
within state's EEZs, it also definitively overrules arguments made
by some whaling nations that protective measures for marine
mammals can do no more than ensure the maintenance of a maxi-
mum sustainable yield." This shows that the changing trend
within the IWC from management, to conservation, to protection
of whale stocks is mirrored by the environmentalists and conser-
vationists of many nations, and more importantly by the interna-
tional document that recognizes the IWC's power to supersede
sovereign rights within the EEZ for the betterment of cetaceans.
Article 65 recognizes the ability of the IWC to regulate or pro-
hibit whaling within a nation's EEZ. The IWC is afforded the
same rights over the high seas by article 120 of UNCLOS, which
states that "Article 65 also applies to the conservation and man-
agement of marine mammals in the high seas."76 The extension of
article 65 into the high seas, by the text of article 120, allows the
IWC to regulate and prohibit whaling on the high seas in order to
avoid a tragedy of the commons. As such, the provisions of
UNCLOS, especially the protection of Article 65, recognize the
IWC's ability to intrude upon the sovereign rights of nations with
regard to regulating and restricting whaling on the high seas and
EEZ's of the world. UNCLOS therefore allows the IWC to apply
the Convention in all waters of the globe in which whaling is pros-
ecuted (save those of territorial seas and land stations). Although
73. Id. at 423.
74. Bernard H. Oxman, The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211, 233 (1981).
75. Id.
76. LOS Convention, supra note 3, at 442.
338
LAW OF THE SEA
I believe the Commission is still able to apply the Convention to
territorial seas and land stations, UNCLOS does nothing to limit
the exploitation of marine mammals in these two areas.
4. ENFORCING IWC REGULATIONS
The ICRW lacked the power to vest within the Commission
the ability to enforce its regulations; and although there is now a
way of legally binding a nation to the decisions of the Commission,
that power still does not lie in the hands of the IWC. Nonetheless,
there is now a vehicle to compel the pro-whaling states to comply
with the decisions of the IWC. The articles of UNCLOS include a
dispute settlement procedure that one nation may bring against
another for disputes arising from interpretations of rights and
responsibilities of member states under UNCLOS.
States party to both the ICRW and UNCLOS, or only the lat-
ter, have available and are subject to the dispute settlement provi-
sions of UNCLOS." Part XV of UNCLOS (Settlement of Disputes)
is compulsory and binding when it applies, and including for dis-
putes over an agreement (the ICRW Schedule) about taking
whales on the high seas or about the legality of IWC regulations
superseding a nation's sovereign rights under UNCLOS." Article
286 of UNCLOS states that any dispute concerning the interpre-
tation or application of the UNCLOS provisions shall, where no
settlement is reached between the parties involved, be submitted
at the request of any party to the court or tribunal having jurisdic-
tion." Violations of IWC regulations would be covered in the dis-
pute settlement provisions of UNCLOS where state parties are
unable to resolve a dispute "concerning the interpretation or
application of an international agreement related to the purposes
of UNCLOS."'o More directly, Article 288 (paragraph 1) grants
jurisdiction to a court or tribunal under the dispute settlement
provisions of UNCLOS arising from any dispute concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention." Thus, any dis-
putes arising from the relationship between UNCLOS and the
IWC, including: the IWC as the "appropriate" international organ-
ization to be "worked through" with regards to cetacean manage-
ment, and the abilities granted to the IWC by article 65 and 120 of
77. Burke, supra note 1, at 62.
78. Id.
79. LOS Convention, supra note 3, at 509.
80. Id. at 510.
81. Id. at 510.
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UNCLOS to place stricter regulations (including a moratorium) in
EEZ's and the high seas respectively, fall under the jurisdiction of
Part XV of UNCLOS. As such, the effectiveness of the ICRW's
objections clause as a means of bypassing IWC regulations
(including the commercial whaling moratorium) could be rendered
null and void by invoking the dispute settlement provisions of
UNCLOS.
It is also reasonable to conclude that any state action dimin-
ishing the effectiveness of an IWC regulation (abuse of the scien-
tific permit provision for example) will be subject to the dispute
settlement provisions of UNCLOS.8 2 States have the following
means available to settle the dispute:
a. the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea estab-
lished in accordance with Annex VI;
b. the International Court of Justice;
c. an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with
Annex VII;
d. a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance
with Annex VIII"
The ability to bring a state before the International Court of Jus-
tice (ICJ), the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS), or a special arbitral tribunal for diminishing the effec-
tiveness of an IWC regulation, would alleviate various problems
encountered by the IWC in the past. Member state actions such
as using "flags of convenience" to re-flag whaling vessels to bypass
IWC regulations, failing to actively enforce IWC regulations
against their nationals and whaling vessels (in accordance with
article IX of the ICRW), and reporting falsified information to the
Scientific Committee of the IWC, can be brought before a court or
tribunal.
Even though a state's failure to cooperate with, or diminish
the effectiveness of, IWC regulations (by invoking the objections
clause or misusing the scientific research provision for example) is
under the jurisdiction of the dispute settlement provisions of
UNCLOS, it must still be determined how the dispute will arrive
before a court or tribunal. The UNCLOS dispute settlement pro-
visions are read to allow one or more states to bring suit against
another for "alleged" violations and misinterpretations of the
UNCLOS articles. Under Annex VI, the tribunal is not only open
to state parties but also to other entities when all parties of the
82. Ruffle, supra note 7, at 670.
83. LOS Convention, supra note 3, at 509-10.
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dispute acknowledge the jurisdiction of the tribunal.8 4 In the whal-
ing context, the IWC could become a signatory to UNCLOS and
exercise its status as the principle organ of an international
organization if the states party to the IWC voted accordingly."
International organizations which are signatories of UNCLOS
may invoke the dispute settlement provisions concerning the
application or interpretation of the Convention." The notion that
the "appropriate" international organization for the management
of cetaceans may appear before a tribunal to enforce its regula-
tions shows an enormous amount of international support for the
protection of cetaceans, dwarfing that which is seen when single
member states bring suit against one another.
5. WEAKNESSES OF UNCLOS JURISDICTION
As the ideas laid out in this article form a solid foundation for
the international enforcement of the IWC's regulations, and more
importantly the moratorium, the legal structure of the argument
also leaves the foundation vulnerable to crumble. To this point,
the discussion has focused on the anti-whaling nations finding a
binding legal argument to enforce the IWC's regulations, which
was shown with the analysis of articles 65 and 120 of UNCLOS.
However, the dispute settlement provisions of Part XV are a
double-edged sword, allowing the pro-whaling nations to also
bring suit against the IWC and the anti-whaling nations.
In accepting the UNCLOS treaty, "states have agreed to limit
their taking of cetaceans by reference to obligations assumed
under other relevant international agreements."" Although arti-
cle 65 allows the IWC to impose stricter regulations than other-
wise necessary, restrictions that are inconsistent with the ICRW
may actually violate UNCLOS itself." The pro-whaling nations
have always commented that the moratorium goes against the
objectives and purposes of the ICRW, which are to insure a pros-
perous continuation of the commercial whaling industry.
Any possible violation of UNCLOS, through a violation of the
ICRW, would allow a whaling state to bring the issue before a
court or tribunal in the same ways the anti-whaling states may. A
violation of the ICRW may occur if the Commission changes the
84. Burke, supra note 1, at 64
85. Id.
86. LOS Convention, supra note 3, at 580.
87. Burke, supra note 1, at 64.
88. Id.
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Schedule without taking into account the interests of consumers
and the whaling industry, or could be based upon the current com-
mercial whaling moratorium. These actions would be viewed by
the whaling nations as unlawfully restricting their rights to take
living resources on the high seas and within their EEZ's under
UNCLOS. The whaling nations would bring the issue for clarifica-
tion under Article 288 (paragraph 1) for disputes concerning the
interpretation or application of the Convention (Articles 65 and
120)." Another avenue the whaling states could exploit to bring
action before the tribunal is to make an argument about the valid-
ity of the whaling moratorium under the ICRW, creating a dispute
over the interpretation or application of an international treaty
related to the purposes of the Convention.9 0
There is no shortage of actions in the IWC's history that could
be viewed as violating the purpose of the ICRW: the creation of
the Southern Ocean sanctuary; the implementation of the morato-
rium; and statements from nations such as the United Kingdom
that they will not support any future commercial whaling har-
vests, regardless of the best scientific data available." The ques-
tion of actions of the IWC violating the ICRW, and thus UNCLOS,
can be countered in two ways. First, the interpretation of the
IWC's actions and regulations, regarding whether they violate the
ICRW, is not the proper subject matter of an action under Part
XV; and second, the IWC has already determined any compliance
issues internally under the ICRW in approving the regulations,
forming no basis for proceeding under Part XV. 92 These counter
arguments prohibit the whaling nations from exploiting Article
288 (paragraph 2) to elevate the IWC's regulations before a court
or tribunal. As for utilizing Article 288 (paragraph 1) to clarify
the IWC's ability to regulate (and prohibit) whaling in EEZ's and
the high seas, the IWC's jurisdiction is clearly laid out as previ-
ously stated throughout this article. Yet, the interpretation and
application of terms such as "appropriate international organiza-
tion," "to prohibit, limit or regulate the exploitation of marine
mammals more strictly," "co-operate with," and "conservation,
management, and study" under Articles 65 and 120 may always
be open to dispute from both sides of the whaling debate until an
agreement is reached between the member states of UNCLOS or a
89. LOS Convention, supra note 3, at 510.
90. Id.
91. Burke, supra note 1, at 68.
92. Id.
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court/tribunal decision occurs."
Under Part XV of UNCLOS, state parties may settle disputes
arising from the interpretation or application of the Convention
via the dispute settlement provisions as previously discussed.
Although Annex IX allows the IWC the opportunity to become a
signatory to the Convention and to utilize the dispute settlement
provisions, the ICRW itself appears to lack the authority to allow
the Commission to make those decisions of its own accord." Noth-
ing may forbid the member states of the IWC from instructing the
Commission to become a party to the Convention or to bring suit
under the provisions of UNCLOS, but organized resistance from
the pro-whaling nations could disrupt a vote to direct the Commis-
sion to activate the dispute settlement provisions.
In addition, only state parties to UNCLOS may take advan-
tage of the dispute settlement provisions of the Convention." For
reasons which are already the basis of numerous scholastic
endeavors, the United States has never become a party to
UNCLOS even though it considers the Convention as customary
international law. The United States lack of formal membership
in UNCLOS prohibits it from elevating the whaling debate before
a court or tribunal in accordance with Part XV." As such, if the
dispute settlement provisions are to be used to decide the future of
whaling, another nation (and state party to UNCLOS) would need
to take up the United States' historic mantle of marine mammal
protector to bring suit under the Convention.
The pro-whaling nations could also take the traditional posi-
tion against any suit brought against them that states are not
subject to the jurisdiction of an international tribunal absent their
express consent." This traditional position is formed around the
notion that in any specific case, the risk of being sued without
express consent is worse than the risk of being unable to sue with-
out the express consent of the defendant." Fortunately, the
chance of a pro-whaling state withholding their consent is mini-
mal at best. Many states regarded compulsory jurisdiction as
"integral to the very idea of a new convention on the law of the
93. LOS Convention, supra note 3, at 423, 442.
94. Id. at 509.
95. Id. at 578-81.
96. Id. at Part XV.
97. Id.
98. Oxman, Complementary Agreements and Compulsory Jurisdiction, 95 AM. J.
Int'l L. 277, 284 (2001).
99. Id.
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sea."00 With nations such as the United States and Japan (who
are the largest activists on their respective sides of the whaling
debate) rejecting the traditional freedom to consent to jurisdiction
view in favor of compulsory jurisdiction, any parties sued under
Part XV of UNCLOS will most likely grant their consent. As with
any untested legal notion, no scholar can predict with assurance
the judicial precedent that will be set, and both sides should be
leery of rushing to implement the procedures of Part XV of
UNCLOS.
6. CONCLUSION
The current state of the IWC is a precarious arrangement.
Sixty-five years ago the ICRW created a Commission with the
responsibility of managing whales in all waters of the globe, but it
resembled the proverbial "swiss cheese" when it came to manage-
ment loopholes and lack of enforcement power. After a disastrous
beginning, including mismanagement by the Commission and
member nations reporting falsified scientific catch data, it seemed
as if things were changing for the better with the implementation
of the moratorium.
It is obvious to the world that some pro-whaling nations, most
notably Japan, had sidestepped the IWC's decisions and continued
to whale during the moratorium. Utilization of the objections
clause, abuse of the scientific permit provision, and the exploita-
tion of "flags of convenience" whaling vessels (pirate whalers)
accounted for a large take of whales. The obvious abuse of scien-
tific whaling permitted the Japanese to continue to harvest
whales, but in the global spotlight. The world knows that Japan is
violating the ICRW and the nation is publicly scrutinized and
requested constantly to produce scientific data to show their "sci-
entific" harvests are not endangering the species. The situation is
reminiscent of a small child and a cookie jar. Every parent knows
that children want a reason to eat cookies, and if not given per-
mission to have one will then sneak cookies from the jar when the
parent is not looking. As long as the cookie jar is not noticeably
empty when the parent opens it next, the theft is normally for-
given. In this case everyone is watching the scientific harvests,
and as long as the Japanese are not too greedy, there is no endan-
gering of the stocks and the transgression goes unpunished.
Even with the support of governments such as the United
100. Id .at 285.
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States, United Kingdom, and Australia; pressure from NGO's
such as the Sea Shepard Society; and a global outcry from scien-
tists and environmentalists; there is still a small harvest of
whales each year, but not one of such proportions that could
harm the whale stocks. If the international community cannot
live with these small infringements on their ideals, even though
the pro-whaling countries are mostly in line with following the
moratorium, then the time has come to show the interactions of
the IWC and UNCLOS.
The UNCLOS treaty makes numerous references to other
agreements, subjecting parties of UNCLOS to obligations derived
from agreements to which they are not necessarily a party to but
are now compelled to follow.10 Article 65 of UNCLOS is one such
reference. Through interpretation of the article, it obligates mem-
bers of UNCLOS to "work through" the IWC in its capacity as the
"appropriate" international organization to manage cetaceans.
This includes the ability of the IWC to place stricter regulations or
moratoriums on whaling on the high seas and in the EEZ's of
member nations. Although these regulations limit the sovereign
rights of nations in those areas, rights that are guaranteed by
UNCLOS, the UNCLOS articles state that the IWC regulations
may limit "exploitation of marine mammals more strictly than
provided for" in UNCLOS.
Any dispute arising from a nation's violation of the IWC's new
global authority dealing with the interpretation of a nation's obli-
gations to the IWC under the UNCLOS articles, or state action
diminishing the effectiveness of an IWC regulation, is under the
jurisdiction of Part XV of UNCLOS. Nations can bring suit
against one another, or another entity, before one of four groups:
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, an arbitral tribunal in accordance with
Annex VII, or a special arbitral tribunal in accordance with Annex
VIII. The decisions of these tribunals are binding to the states
involved and could create a new judicial precedent in the whaling
controversy. With any dispute, there are arguments for both
sides, creating the possibility that the plaintiff may be ruled
against.
This article explored the effects of UNCLOS on the powers of
the IWC and outlined a concept that legally binds members of
UNCLOS to obey the regulations of the IWC. As an avid admirer
101. Burke, supra note 1, at 63.
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of cetaceans, a perfect world would be able to utilize the concepts
laid out and permanently outlaw the harvesting of whales, save
for truly scientific purposes. The ICRW is sixty years old and the
current decisions of the IWC must be viewed in this light. While
pro-whaling nations argue that the IWC has violated the purposes
and objectives that it was created to protect, perhaps the current
actions of the IWC show the evolution of the ICRW. The world as
a whole has changed from exploitation of resources to conserva-
tion, and the IWC is no different. Even UNCLOS, through the
highly supported and sought after article 65, shows the desire of
nations to protect cetaceans. The adoption of UNCLOS roughly
forty years after the inception of the ICRW shows the evolution of
man's relationship with the whale.
